Elites Gone Wild: The Origin and Meaning of the New Populism
The new populist right is demonized and feared by many. But does this movement actually have a point? Surprisingly, David Brooks of all people, gives the question serious consideration.
Recently, something truly shocking happened. David Brooks, no friend to populists (left or right), published an article entitled, “What if we’re the bad guys?” In this candid and surprising essay, Brooks considers the possibility that the populist right is correct to blame institutional elites for our current malaise. Without a doubt Brooks is a card-carrying member of the institutional elite and a famous anti-Trumper on the right. Therefore, it is surprising to see him considering the populist right; it is even more surprising to see Brooks calling into question the usual left and right dichotomy. In an inversion that is difficult to execute, he exposes the fact that institutional elites on the left and right often have more in common than they have with their philosophical allies in lower strata of society. So rather than think along the horizontal left-right axis, one needs to invert his point of view and see American society not as a clash of ideas but a clash of class interests — the elite versus “the people.”
Antipathy between the rich and the poor, the few and the many, or the elite and the people is hardly novel. Indeed both history and political theory often converge on this topic. American aversion to issues of class is an effect of American individualism, capitalism, and free-market absolutism — at the heart of the matter is the belief that liberal freedom is a sufficient panacea to remove all unjust economic disparities. In addition, the topic of class conflict is often associated with Marxism and then immediately dismissed. However, Marxism does not have a corner on class-conscience political analysis. Perhaps surprisingly, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and many other ancient political thinkers were well aware of the role that class plays in society, and developed keen insights related to these matters. Indeed, these insights can go a long way to achieving a deeper and more satisfying understanding of our own political malaise.
Class, Character, and Politics
When analyzing the spectrum of political arrangements, the ancients tended to focus less on ideas (although ideas remain important) and more on basic human motivations, social structures, and class interests. Plato taught that the poor and wealthy will always be at war in any city that is not ruled by the wise. Aristotle argued that the conditions of the middle class are those most favorable towards virtue, whereas the wealthy and poor tend towards various vices. He further insisted that differing sorts of populations were more or less adaptive to diverse regimes. Only a virtuous population was fit for republican kind of government. And Cicero famously observed that class conflict between the optimes and populari was the undoing of the old Roman constitution. Indeed, it is worth noting that from its inception, the Roman republic explicitly recognized that the wealthy and the poor (or the many) were opposed to one another, and the Roman constitution sought to balance the power between the wealthy and the many. The Roman state dealt with this problem formally by the legal arrangement of offices, and informally, through the ethos of patronage.
The Roman system of patronage is well known at the personal and individual level. Less wealthy clients would pledge services and praise to wealthy patrons in exchange for protection and financial assistance. The clients provided patrons with a wider network of influence and prestige, and provided vulnerable clients with some measure of security. More importantly for our purposes, this sort of arrangement penetrated the wider political ethos of ancient Rome.
The Roman common man was no anarchist or communist. He wanted to hold onto his ancient prestige, customs, and rights and envied against any pretensions or usurpations of his betters. At the same time, common man of Rome was not in principle against order and hierarchy, and rightly so. One could hardly have a decent society without elites; every community needs men of high quality to lead, organize, command, propose, and prohibit. Indeed, almost any project requires the coordination of multiple parts, which means that there will be a division between leaders and followers. Even democratic Athens expected that leadership would be exercised by a certain class distinguished by its education, pedigree, and prestige. The same is true of republican Rome and the old American republic. In fact, in some ways the Roman free farmer expected the maintenance of hierarchy. Nevertheless, in a decent political community, tacit consent to hierarchy is conditioned on a patronal attitude of elites towards the rest of society. The elite are to exercise, a benign, wise, and restrained authority over their fellow countrymen such that the common good is advanced. In this sort of tacit arrangement, one may expect a certain tension between the elite and the many, but not outright conflict. This sort of informal compact is quite durable, and we see it proliferated across a broad range of cultures.
Elite Betrayal
Although the hierarchical compact is solid and enduring it can break down, especially if the elites betray their side of the bargain. When the elites come to be seen as hostile and exploitative in their relationship to the many, an angry popular resentment begins to smolder. If this situation continues and grievances multiply, popular resentment can break out into popular active resistance. And the history of Rome is littered with conflicts arising from popular resistance — from the Gracchi brothers to Sula, and Julius Caesar to Pompey. Although usually less bloody, this ancient dynamic is the same energy at play in modern populism, including our current American experience. And this is where ancient philosophy and history illumine our current situation.
Contemporary populism — left and right — is motivated by the widely held perception that America’s elites have betrayed the hierarchical compact. In this perspective, elites have turned against ordinary Americans and use institutional power for corrupt ends. This impression is aggravated by the further perception that our elites do not share our values and even despise the customs and preferences of plain folk. This kind of alienation is especially felt by those who hold traditional values. Many incidents lend credibility to these impressions. When the real-estate crisis struck, gigantic wealthy banks were bailed out while ordinary Americans suffered. Over the last decade economic inequality has accelerated while median wages have stagnated and opportunities for the many have seemed to decline. Left-wing elites openly demonize ordinary Americans with conservative beliefs — especially white evangelicals and Catholics. These people are labeled as fascists and “deplorables”; they are said to be clinging to their guns and religion. Many believe that elites wielded abusive power during the covid-19 epidemic. Throughout the country, elite institutions promote a “woke” agenda that plain Americans oppose. The list could go on and on.
The Rise of Donald Trump
Given the manifold grievances endured by ordinary Americans, one should hardly be surprised by rise of populism. The white-hot flashpoint of this development was the election of Donald Trump and the ongoing controversies connected to the 2020 presidential election. Indeed, populist anger is veritably incarnated in the person of Donald Trump. In the furor that followed Trump’s 2016 victory, the most important and interesting question was ignored, namely, how was it possible for Trump to defeat institutional elites on the left and the right. Of course, the left can generate lazy appeals to racism and xenophobia, but such explanations not only miss the mark, they obscure the more important answer. Trump is not the problem (although he is problematic). Trump is the consequence of elite failure; the leadership class failed and Trump is the result. The elite have abused their power, impoverished the many, and incited cultural revolution. This line of thought raises the further question, “why have the elite turned against the folk?” (I will pass on this question for now but I will return to it in a subsequent Letter.) And perhaps more importantly, what is to be done? If the problem is the decadence of the leadership class, how can we recover?
In a sense, the solution to our current crisis is straightforward. If the elite are the problem, fix the elite. The leadership class needs to be held to high standards; they must be trained and educated in the classics so that they will have a high esteem for public service and despise decadence and tyranny; they must be men of exemplary character; and where the elite indulge in craven corruption they must be ruthlessly prosecuted. Second, the leadership class must reorganize the economy in line with the common good. Third, the elite must desist in their public hostility towards traditional culture.
The solutions I have proposed are obvious and straightforward, but is it likely that any of this will be done?
Are our current elites capable of reforming themselves?
Probably not. The pigs are sucking at the trough, and it is unlikely that they will pull off any time soon.
Are the many capable of forcing reform on our current elites?
Perhaps, but only here and there.
What then is the solution?
New elites.
Remember the words of Jesus:
Neither do people pour new wine into old wineskins. If they do, the skins will burst; the wine will run out and the wineskins will be ruined. No, they pour new wine into new wineskins, and both are preserved” (Matthew 9:16-17).
Well said. Just read this great article on stupidity, as Bonhoeffer has laid it out, by @AlexandraHudson on Civic Renaissance and thought it would make a great dialogue partner for your article. It is easy to judge the lesser educated as dumb while being blind for institutional and elitist stupidity. I have not grown up with elitist education as it is perfected in the US and I am still not quite getting it. So I guess Brooks has a point here. Thank you.