Introducing Civic Realism: Moving Beyond Ideology
Our contemporary political ideologies are exhausted. We are left with little more than grandiose virtue-signaling. It is time to return to the perennial truths of classical political thought.
One of the principal goals of this newsletter is to expose readers to the insights and rich resources of ancient philosophy. Although these resources are well known to specialists and to some fortunate students and readers, the great philosophical traditions of ancient Greece and Rome deserve to be better known; this is especially true with respect to ancient political philosophy.
In our own time, political analysis is constantly misguided by ideology, whether left or right. These systems of thought are really ideas and rhetorical flourishes stitched together in order to justify the agenda of various factions. Ideologies manipulate, direct, and motivate; they do not really illumine, explain, and define.
Ancient political philosophy operates at a different level altogether. Although Aristotle and Plato differ on the nature of political community and justice, they agree in their genuine and systematic effort to lay open the fundamental realities of political life and justice — they strove to make sense of political reality. In other words, ancient political philosophers sought to produce knowledge of political reality. In Aristotelian terms, ancient political philosophy seeks to understand the first causes of political reality. As in so many things, I believe that Aristotle came closest to the mark. His school of political thought stands out for its flexibility and prudence, its emphasis on unity and diversity, and especially for the way in which political practice is rooted in the reality of human nature.
In subsequent newsletters, I intend to outline the broad sweep of Aristotle’s political thought, augmented by the best insights of complementary thinkers — a form of political thought that I like to call civic realism. I use the term advisedly, although I know that it will cause some confusion.
Civic realism is an apt name for Aristotelian political theory for several reasons. First, for Aristotle politics is a natural reality, rooted in the reality of the human person. For this reason, there is a truth to be had about politics; it is not completely subject to human caprice. Second, the term “civic realism” is justified because Aristotle (and his followers) teach that politics is its own reality, distinct from the reality of the individual or other forms of organization. Again, there is a reality here that serves as a standard and foundation for thinking wisely about politics. Finally, Aristotelian thought has an affinity for contemporary “realist” political theory, with its emphasis on power dynamics. To be sure, there is a normative character to Aristotelian political thought, but this balanced the limits of human nature and a strong emphasis on prudence, circumstances, and political psychology. (In a subsequent newsletter I will argue that Aristotle’s thought, when slightly adjusted, overcomes the descriptive, normative divide of contemporary theory).
I have written at length about civic realism in my short book Understanding Modern Political Ideas. What follows is an extended extract that should serve as an adequate introduction to this approach to politics. There will be much more to follow.
“Man by nature is a political animal.[1] This is the foundational thesis of classical political wisdom, and it points to man’s innate inclination to political life. Despite the strife and displeasure often occasioned by politics, the historical record verifies man’s political inclination; wherever humanity flourishes, we also find political order. This is so because political community perfects man.[2] It concentrates resources in a way that makes possible the division of labor, specialization, and the diversification of markets. These factors increase productivity and the range of available goods and services, which in turn enriches our lives and creates opportunity. More importantly, this sort of economic development increases human security and provides the leisure and abundance required for some men to dedicate themselves to the task of cultural development and the pursuit of wisdom. In addition, political community possesses the wherewithal — the overall strength and resources — to bring about security, justice, the arts, sound customs, and good morals. For these reasons, Saint Thomas Aquinas claimed that a certain form of human happiness (or blessedness) is proper to political life.[3]
Human blessedness or happiness may be divided into perfect and imperfect.[4] The highest and purest form of beatitude is supernatural communion with the Holy Trinity in the kingdom of God. This is perfect beatitude, it does not properly belong to politics, and it cannot be achieved through man’s natural powers.[5] This is among the most important political lessons of Christianity — we must not look for ultimate happiness in or through political life. Christian faith rejects all earthly utopias. The kind of beatitude that is proper to political life is imperfect active happiness; it consists in the virtuous use of temporal goods; it is governed primarily by the four cardinal virtues; and it is properly political. In sum, active happiness consists in the virtuous use, development, and exchange of basic goods and services.[6]
Active happiness is properly political and properly common. Why is this so? Active happiness is political because it can only be achieved effectively and rationally by the cooperative action of the political community. Classically the political community is defined as the “perfect community” — not because the political community is morally pristine, but because it is complete for active happiness. The political community possesses the resources to produce, develop, and distribute external goods effectively. It combines many families and specialized communities into a cooperative whole with the wherewithal to divide labor, foster efficient markets, establish security, create a legal system, and cultivate high culture and good morals. For these reasons and others, political community is the natural context for active happiness.
Active happiness is common because it is achieved through group action, that is, it is achieved through the cooperation of the whole. This involves self-sacrifice, integrated action, cooperation, shared purpose, and mutual support — something akin to friendship. Actions of this sort are oriented towards objectives that are jointly desirable, that is, desirable for the whole. Classically such objectives are recognized as “common goods.” In contemporary discourse these goods are often undervalued but they are really essential aspects of life. In fact, once you begin looking for the common good, you will see it everywhere: cooperative business operations, effective educational institutions, family life, military victory, virtuous friendship, and even playing a game. In fact, every community or institution is defined by some shared purpose, that is, some common good.
Technically speaking, a common good is a good one in number shared by many. By contrast, an individual good, for example my health may only be enjoyed by one directly. My health is mine and not the health of others; it is the condition of this body and not another. The common good differs sharply from the individual good. The common good is something that perfects and benefits a whole group, for example, the victory of the team. [7]
Active happiness is a common good.[8] The virtuous development and use of external goods requires a great deal of cooperation whether in the business world or in family life. We can only flourish when we live cooperatively with others in well-ordered community. For this reason, the political community is considered to be a perfect whole whereas the individual is an imperfect part. This comparison is not intended to aggrandize the state and diminish the individual; rather it points to the causal priority of the community. It is the community that is sufficient for active happiness, not the individual as such; the individual depends upon the wider context of the community to develop and flourish. The individual is called a part because he depends upon the political whole.[9]
The relative perfection of the political whole is one premise among others supporting the primacy of the common good over the individual good. Simply stated the common good of the political whole is to be preferred and loved over the individual good. This does not mean that the individual good of the person is wrong or undesirable. Rather, it simply means that the common good of the whole is more desirable than the individual good. In saying this, it is important to realize that the individual good is not necessarily voided by the common good; it remains a legitimate aspiration as long as it is in line with the over-arching common good of the community. Moreover, the common good is not an alien good to the person. Rather it is the common good of the person, that is, it is the good that each citizen shares with others. And it is in fact the higher good of the person. So when the person pursues the common good, he is in fact pursuing his own good, just not his individual good.[10]” (Understanding Modern Political Ideas, c. 1. Classical Political Thought)
In the book, I go on to identify three distinctive characteristics of civic realism (“classical political thought”): political order is real; political order is oriented towards substantive human goods; political order is communitarian rather than individualistic. Any of these three theses is worth a lengthy analysis. For now, I hope this is sufficient to ‘whet the appetite’ for more.
Please consider purchasing my book, Understanding Modern Political Ideas.
[1] Aristotle, Politics, I.2.
[2] Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Politics, 1.1.17, 23-29, 3.5.4; Commentary on the Ethics, 1.1.4.
[3] Commentary on the Ethics, X.11.2, 4, 5, and X.12.1-5 (active happiness defined); Commentary on the Sentences II.41.q1, II.34.1.4, III.37.1.2qc2; Commentary on the Politics (SP), III.5.4.
[4] Summa Theologiae, I-II.5 (1271); Commentary on the Ethics, I. L9-12 (1271-1272).
[5] ST I-II.3.1. and 5.5.
[6] ST II-II.179.1-2, 181.1 ad1, and 182.2. Beyond imperfect acquired active happiness is imperfect acquired contemplative happiness, sometimes referred to as natural happiness or simply imperfect happiness. This kind of happiness concerns the contemplation of the highest things, but not without the moral virtues. At the same time, this sort of contemplative happiness is not the common good of the city. These two ends are not contrary but hierarchically ordered. However, very importantly, even contemplative happiness is subordinated to the higher common good of the perfection of the universe and the higher common good of God’s own essence. In sum, every good life will possess civic virtue, but beyond this, the best life will reach out to contemplative happiness.
[7] Commentary on the Sentences, III. 30.1.1 ad4; STh I-II.96.3. See also my article, “The Meaning and Importance of Common Good,” The Thomist, 80:4 (October, 2016), 587-589.
[8] Nota bene: remember that active happiness does not strictly speaking include contemplative happiness. Contemplative happiness strictly speaking belongs to a higher order. Nevertheless, the use and communication of contemplation qua citizen may become part of political life, for use and communication are temporal and active.
[9] Commentary on the Sentences 49.1.1 qc4, ad 3; De Veritate (DV) 7.6 ad7; ST I-II.90.2, ad2.
[10] ST II-II.47.10; Summa Contra Gentiles, III. 17, 69. The common good includes justice. So, although the common good is superior to the individual good, the political whole must treat each of the parts justly. This helps to avoid totalitarian tendencies.