Placing Politics within the Domain of Human Action: The Shape of Thomist Political Philosophy
Given the failure of modern ideologies, it is time to return to a deeper, more realistic, and more rigorous form of political thought, namely, Thomist political philosophy.
Modern political analysis often takes the form of contemporary political science, which consists primarily (but not exclusively) in the statistical analysis of political behavior. The overall result is an account of politics that is primarily positivistic, legalistic, and descriptive. The normative or prescriptive task of political analysis is left to advocates and journalistic commentators. This side of analysis is largely regarded as opinion, and the upshot is a hodgepodge of opinion and advocacy layered over quantitative research.
In principle, there is nothing wrong with the use of quantitative political research. It is capable of accurately tracking political behavior, especially voting patterns in advanced democracies, and making probabilistic predictions. These are important data points for understanding contemporary political trends and constructing political narratives rooted in demographic patterns. Nevertheless, such accounts fall short of the explanatory depth and breadth proper to a rigorous, empirical-deductive science of politics.
In the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, science begins with experience, but it does not remain at the level of phenomena. Rather, rigorous, philosophical science defines the subject matter, identifies principles, uncovers the relevant universal causes, and demonstrates essential properties and conclusions. And very importantly, science about practical matters includes normative conclusions about what should and should not be done. Thomist political philosophy embodies these criteria, and, as such, it aspires to provide an analysis of politics that is at once causal, systematic, and deductive, but rooted in experience and fully prescriptive. In what follows, I shall sketch the general framework and procedures of Thomist political philosophy.
The Subject Matter of Political Philosophy
Rigorous philosophical enquiry presupposes a clear understanding of the subject matter; ultimately, a definition of the subject matter is required. And as any student of logic will attest, forming an adequate definition is sometimes more difficult than anticipated. Indeed, this is evident to anyone who has read the Socratic dialogues. A definition is determined by identifying the specific characteristic that differentiates the subject matter from closely related concepts (technically, other members of the genus). The test of a good definition is that it is neither too broad nor too narrow: it should only cover the subject matter, and it should not exclude any genuine instances.
So, what is a political community? First, it is evident that a political community is a group or composite whole, but not a substantive whole. It is a group of individual substances. However, this is not quit correct because the individual substances — individual men and women — are members of various other groups. To put it another way, political community is a group made up of less comprehensive groups — families, smaller physical communities, and various associations — and finally these lesser groups are composed of individuals. In sum, political community is not a substantive whole; it is a potential whole, composed of groups of individuals, and it is fully capable of cooperation for the common good.
One unfortunate side effect of learning the Aristotelian distinction between substance and accident is the tendency to discount the latter — to act and speak as if accidents are trivial. Nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, many of the most important aspects of life are technically accidents: friendships, virtues, arts, sciences, etc. Political community is an accident, but real whole. To be specific, the political community is a potential whole, that is, the kind of whole that has the potential (the power) to perform as certain form of action. To put it another way, a potential whole is a composite unified by action because it possesses the parts requisite for the action and the parts are rightly arranged. For example, think of an army, symphony, or sports team. These are accidental realities, but true realities all the same. And political community is just this sort of whole.
Political community is a composite of smaller communities united by action for the political common good. Of course, no political community is faultless; indeed many political communities fail to reach the common good, just like many armies fail to triumph on the field. Nevertheless, such communities exist, and they are specified by their power for such action, not their actual success. For this reason, Aristotle famously says that such communities are perfect, that is, they are complete for the common good. Of course, much, much more could be said on this point, but my aim in this essay is to provide a general overview of the science. Therefore, the subject matter of political philosophy is the kind of community with the power to act for the common good, but this sort of community founded on a specific form of human action.
The Principles of Political Philosophy
Understood in this way, the study of political philosophy belongs to the domain of human action. Politics is not a matter of brute facts or unthinking forces. Politics is not the weather; it cannot be understood in terms of rigid predictions and mechanistic interactions. Politics takes place in the conflicted maelstrom of human passions, intentions, choices, inclinations, customs, memories, et cetera. As such, it can only be understood in the light of the truth about the human person and the nature of human action. Accordingly, the principles of political philosophy are drawn from the psychology of human action. For example, these basic principles apply to the analysis of politics: (1) all human action is motivated by the perception of the something as desirable in one way or another; (2) human action is voluntary and intentional; (3) the rule and measure of human action is the good; (4) the species of action is defined by the matter about which, (5) the passions are among the predominate sources of human action, and so on. Hence, when we inquire into a concrete set of political developments, we should not imagine that these events are the inevitable outcome of a deterministic dialectic. Rather, political institutions, practices, and events emerge from concrete human actions, choices, and passions. In principle, things always could have been otherwise, so it is reasonable to ask, “why this arrangement rather than another?” Similarly, the use of coercive force in politics will need to be understood primarily in terms of those who are being acted upon, that is, the matter about which of an action. It matters a great deal, whether force is used against innocent allies or Islamists terrorists.
In addition, to the remote principles of human action, political philosophy requires principles that are more proximate to the political life: (1) a full definition of the specifically political common good; (2) definitions of war, punishment, public authority, etc.; and (3) a robust account of law, since most political actions are carried out in relation to law in one way or another. Taken together the principles of human action and the proximate principles of politics (law, war, monarchy, and so on) provide a robust framework for disputing the primary topics of political philosophy.
The Disputed Questions of Political Philosophy
The primary questions of political philosophy include the following: (1) whether the common good is primary over the individual good; (2) whether the individual is bound to obey political authority; (3) what is the purpose of political community? Is it positive or merely negative? (4) Whether it is just to sacrifice the individual good of the part for the common good of the whole? (5) What is the best regime? And so on. These, of course, are the really great questions of political philosophy, and interestingly their answers are often assumed without argument. In addition to the great questions of politics, one must also consider questions regarding war, punishment, taxation, custom, education, and similar matters. The serious study of these questions is both challenging and rewarding; indeed it could take up a lifetime of serious work. But what is really important here is to see the place of the questions within the overall architecture of political philosophy.
The topics of political philosophy are not to be determined by mere rhetoric or the empirio-metric measurement of behavior. Such an approaches would fall short of the full scientific rigor proper to this inquiry. Rather the determinations of these topics, must proceed deductively from the proper and remote principles of political philosophy; ultimately, these questions must be tested against the common good of the nation, the architectonic principle in all political matters. Developed in this way, political philosophy shows itself to be a fully scientific enterprise, capable of providing an objective framework for disputing the central questions of politics. Such debates should be shaped by care for the common good of the nation. Of course, real political debates will focus on real, concrete developments such as the threat of a particular war or aggressive global faction.
A Final Thought
One last point is worth stressing. The Aristotelian-Thomist approach to political philosophy is not an idealistic aspiration, and it is not an ideology. Rather it is an enquiry, both descriptive and normative, into political reality, namely, the reality of communities that are capable of taking cooperative action for the common good. This kind of cooperation is among the most powerful forces for good or ill in the world and as such, it is imperative that it be studied, understood, and rightly directed. Nothing less than human flourishing is at stake. Given the failure of modern ideologies, it is time to return to something better and deeper.