Missing the Common Good: A Thomist Analysis
In a previous Logos Letter I introduced readers to what I call “Civic Realism”— a synthesis of ancient political philosophy based on the principle that man is naturally political.
In a previous Logos Letter I introduced readers to what I call “Civic Realism”— a synthesis of ancient political philosophy based on the principle that man is naturally political. In this view, political community is a natural and even preeminent element of man’s natural flourishing. We have political communities because they are integral to human flourishing and development. Accordingly, individuals are compared to the political community (the state) as an imperfect part to a perfect (complete) whole because the perfection of the individual — in certain respects — depends on participation in the state. (For more details, see L.L. Jan. 12, 2023). For this reason and others, Aristotle, Plato, and others, argue that within the well-ordered civitas, the individual good is subordinate to the common good of the state, just as the imperfect is subject to the perfect. But if this is so, then it is very important to understand the precise meaning of the political common good. Unfortunately, the common good is often misunderstood.
What follows below is an analysis of mistaken interpretations of the common good, namely the utilitarian and theological errors. These thoughts were originally presented in a paper delivered to the American Maritain Association.
The Egalitarian Error
Perhaps the most common error associated with the political common good is the view political common good means equality without qualification. It is sometimes opined that perhaps we cannot achieve absolute equality, but we should have as much equality as possible. In this perspective, the political common good is opposed to inequality. This distortion of the political common good is the one most commonly associated with popular notions of social justice. I will call this error the egalitarian error because of its distorted emphasis on equality.
Now to be sure, equality is connected to the political common good through the virtue of justice. Justice includes a certain kind of equality and the political common good is regulated by justice; therefore it follows that the political common good has some relation to equality. However, we need greater precision in this matter. What kind of justice is associated with equality and what kind of equality is relevant?
First, justice as a general virtue — political justice — is oriented towards the rendering what is due to the common good. As noted earlier we often serve the common good simply by fulfilling our proper functions as artisans, husbands, teachers, and wives. Beyond this, the average citizen serves the common good by obeying the legitimate laws, paying taxes, defending the community, et cetera. But none of this bears on a relevant sense of equality. For the most part, ordinary citizens exercise this form of justice by carrying out the ordinary duties of their particular state of life and obeying just laws. Equality as it is commonly considered does not come in here. However, justice considers not only what the parts owe to the whole, but also what the whole owes to the parts. Following Aristotle, Thomas calls this distributive justice. This kind of justice is given primarily to the care of the political authority, and it seems to be the primary interest of egalitarians.
For Thomas, the political whole owes certain things to the political parts. In this perspective, the political authority does not exist only for the protection of individual rights; it has a positive obligation to insure that certain goods are enjoyed or available to citizens.[1] Indeed, for Thomas it belongs to distribute justice to distribute the goods that belong to the whole to the parts according to a certain equality. However, the equality that Thomas has in mind is not arithmetical. Rather Thomas teaches that the relevant sense of equality is geometrical and proportionate. Arithmetic equality means a strict quantitative equality between two subjects; proportionate equality is more complex. In one way, when I distribute grades to my students, I do so equally, that is I apply the same standard. But in applying the same standard different quantities are produced. The excellent student receives a score of 95, whereas the middling student receives a score of 75. Here the quantities are unequal in comparison to each other but they are equal to the merit of the student, that is, these scores are proportionate to the merit of the student. Here in fact, arithmetic equality would be unjust. To award the excellent student and the middling student equally would in fact be unjust; in this scenario arithmetic inequality ends up being just. So equality is important for distributive justice, but it does not necessarily bring about an arithmetical equality between subjects and in some cases produces inequality. But this is not the whole story.[2]
According to distributive justice, citizens should receive goods proportionate to what is due to them within a given society. In Summa Theologiae, Prima-Secunda 61.2 Thomas focuses on the prominence and contribution of someone to society, which differs according to the nature of the society. Here the emphasis is on contribution to society and the principle of social organization. In other passages, Thomas supports what is traditionally called the right of necessity in regards to the distribution of goods. For example in his famous discussion of theft in the case of necessity he argues that the excess of another may be appropriated by those in grave need without committing the sin of theft, which suggests that at least temporal necessities are owed to those in need.[3] This interpretation is supported by the fact that Thomas recognizes that private possession is justified for the sake of meeting human need and that the natural law requires a community of goods in regards to use.[4] For this reason, justice requires that even if private possession is permitted, material things should be used in common, that is, to meet human need. Again, this strongly suggests that necessary temporal goods are owed to those in need and this line of interpretation is commonly held in the subsequent Thomist tradition.[5]
Temporal goods should be distributed to citizens proportionate to position, contribution, and need; this is part of the political common good. But contrary to the egalitarianism, distributive justice does not require or even recommend an arithmetic equality of temporal goods between citizens. In fact, if the Thomist doctrine is correct, an arithmetically equal distribution of goods would often be unjust, just like giving the same score to the excellent student and the middling student. To distribute equals to those who are unequal is not just. Rather, distributive justice requires that unequal goods are distributed to those whose position, contribution, or need are unequal. To be sure, those who are in need justly deserve a distribution of necessary goods. So we can infer from the Thomist doctrine a robust set of social services that support decent living standards for all, but not equal living standards for all. This arrangments is not an equal distribution of temporal goods carte blanche and it in no way precludes inequality. In sum, the egalitarian distortion of the common good is mistaken about the kind of equality that is appropriate to distributive justice. Distributive justice requires a distribution of temporal goods that is proportionate to social position, contribution, and basic need, not an arithmetically equal distribution of temporal goods.
The Theological Error
Finally, some who are theologically motivated have taken on the errors outlined in this paper, especially the egalitarian error, due to confusion over the temporal and eternal. The deep theological issues that are relevant here, including diverse interpretations of the kingdom of God, the gospel, and eschatology, are beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, the Thomist doctrine of the political common good developed in this paper can contribute to clarifying the confusion.
As has been stated, the political common good is the just use, development, and exchange of temporal goods. The goods that are directly proper to political life involves the development and exchange of housing, clothing, food, the arts, economic development, etc. These are real and important goods, but they are passing away; they are temporal and natural, whereas the good proper to sacred doctrine and the theological virtues is eternal and supernatural. Simply put, acquired active happiness and eternal happiness are not the same thing, so the political common good and the eternal good of man are not the same. Of course, the eternal good is the supreme good and it is even a common good, namely, the vision and enjoyment of the divine essence shared by the communion of saints. But, the temporal common good is proper to the political community; the eternal common good is proper to the church.[6] Recognizing this distinction is important because failure to do so leads to an over-theologizing of the political.
The theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, along with the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the various works of mercy are ordered to the eternal good. To be sure, proximately charity may move us to act for the temporal good of our neighbor, but the formal object here is not the due and the ultimate final cause is not the temporal good but eternal beatitude. And most importantly, the relevant temporal good maintains a certain distinction and proper integrity; it is not simply collapsed into the eternal good, but hierarchically ordered to the higher good. The temporal good in question retains its distinction from eternal good despite its hierarchical ordering. This is especially important with respect to the relationship between justice and charity. Charity as a general virtue may order the acts of all of the virtues, including justice, to the end of eternal beatitude.[7] Charity may move a Christian soldier to obey his superior and keep his post. But for all of this justice does not cease to be justice; justice is not simply collapsed into charity and military duty is not collapsed into eternal beatitude. By subordinating his act of obedience to charity, the Christian soldier becomes the subject of a sanctifying act, but he does not cease to be a soldier. To be sure, the theological virtues enrich civic life; likewise they combat the corrupting vices of greed and pride. Nevertheless, political life does not cease to be political; it is not simply absorbed into the church or eternal beatitude. Christian theology demonstrates that political life is not the highest horizon for the human person, but it does not radically alter the meaning and definition of the political common good; Christian life does not replace political life. Failure to recognize this fact leads to a confused and misguided application of charity to political life.
Charity as with any other form of friendship goes beyond the bounds of mere justice. Friendship and justice are not opposed, but a man will do more for his friend than is strictly required by justice. Likewise, a friend may not require strict justice. This is appropriate in friendship, but it would be irresponsible and misguided to replace justice with charity as the proximate governing principle of political life. Politics remains politics even within a theological horizon and the proximate governing principle of politics is justice. A political life ruled by charity would sometimes exceed the demands of justice and sometimes fall short. In sum, politics ruled by a misplaced charity would end up being unjust and therefore corrupted.
There is much more to say about the common good, but it eliminating error is a good start.
The Ligth shines in the darkness.
For more great philosophy and theology, check out the courses and podcasts produced by Catholic Studies Academy.
[1] ST I-II.61.1-2.
[2] SE V.IV.935.
[3] Jean Porter, Ethics of Aquinas, 279.
[4] I-II.66.1-2, 7.
[5] ST I-II.66.1-2. Porter, 280.
[6] Comparison of the active and contemplative life: ST II-II.181.1; SE X.11.6 and X.12.9-10.
[7] DR 2.4 (42: 467). “Quia igitur vite qua hic in presenti bene vivimus finis est beatitudo celestis, ad regis officium pertinet ea ratione bonam vitam multititudinis procurare secundum quod congruit ad celestem beatitudinem consequendam, ut scilicet ea precipiat que ad celestem beatitudinem ducunt, et eorum contraria secundum quod fuerit possibile interdicat.”